

A fresh look at Australian CRE Debt

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F E B R U A R Y 2 0 2 5

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Learning Outcomes

- a balanced appreciation of both the risks and opportunities in CRE lending
- Tools to identify signs of weakness or stress
- A strategy to take advantage of potential stress

Agenda

- 1 How did we get here?
- 2 The post COVID environment
- 3 Identifying the key risks
- 4 Seeking out opportunities

The original gap: 2015 to 2020

Basel III reforms created an opportunity for non-banks to replace banks


Bank Don'ts

⊘ Residential developments where loan to cost is greater than 75%

⊘ Residential developments where <100% of the debt is covered by pre-sales

⊘ Income producing real estate where the rental income is insufficient to repay the loan


Year on Year Growth in Commercial Property Limits (All ADIs)



The emergence of private credit In Australia

A A\$205 billion market


4 Year (2020-2024) CAGR of Private Credit



Source for chart: Ernst & Young, Alvarez & Marshal, IMF

Residential Building Construction Finance


Growth in large business lending mirrors the growth in CRE private lending




A New Gap: 2025 onwards

A storm is brewing

Still the fastest and sharpest rate hiking cycle on record




Office Vacancy Rates settling in the mid-teens as flexible working holds




With rates coming down, are we through the worst of the CRE cycle?

Residential construction costs up >30% since the start of COVID




Apartment construction projects taking longer to complete



Insolvencies


Insolvencies in the construction sector have already surpassed pre-COVID trends

Insolvencies versus pre-COVID trends: All companies excluding construction vs construction only



House prices vs apartments

Apartment prices growing at less than half the rate of houses and less than inflation




Apartment prices

- Up less than 4% p.a. over the last 5 years
- In Melbourne, still below post COVID peak of 21/22
- Rental inflation is moderating

The maths doesn't work

Interest coverage ratio of an office loan

Bank loan balances need to be reduced by >40%
in order to reach a clearing interest cover ratio of 1.75 times



Borrower options

Modify existing loan

OR

Recap with equity

OR

Recap with non-bank debt


OR

Sell the asset

The maths doesn't work

Residential property development

Illustrative example of how property development margins have tracked through time



If the maths doesn't work, why isn't there more stress out there?

Developer options

Complete project at loss

OR

Delay sales and hope house prices increase

OR


Restructure the debt

OR

Walk away


Gaps emerging

Increase in sites for sale Q422-Q425



Kicking the can down the road

In the United States 24% of CRE loans have been modified



Is there evidence of extend and pretend in Australia?

Impact of extend and pretend:

- Lower returns
- Lower distributions
- Increased risk profile

The regulator is watching...

CRE lending is under considerable scrutiny

Will regulatory scrutiny result in reductions to CRE debt allocations?

ASIC has called out...

- Inappropriate TMD statements
- Disclosure of all fees
- Questionable related party transactions
- Improper valuation practices
- Concentration of risk, especially to real estate
- Consistency of terminology

**Focus from ASIC
could lead to
outflows**



**Outflows could
lead to more
stress/less extend
and pretend**

What to watch for


- Reduction of portfolio allocation leading to outflows
- Full disclosure of fees paid implying much higher fee burden to investors
- Less extend and pretend activity as the threshold for RPTs is raised
- More pressure to reduce valuations earlier, less extend and pretend
- Less capital allocated to real estate lending strategies especially in retail
- Higher LVRs reported if based on cost not as if complete

The tide is starting to go out

Managers can only extend loans when they have the capital to do so

Capital flows could turn negative

- Growth in CRE private credit is slowing
- Interest rates are not coming down sharply as hoped
- ASIC is investigating the private credit sector
- Returns are moderating
- Apartment prices are declining
- Negative headlines increasing
 - Lenders enforcing rather than extending
 - Funds suspending redemptions
 - Poor performance
 - Conflicts of interest



The opportunity to step in when others are stepping out

Example transactions for when the tide turns



Office Loan

Description

Newly developed Melbourne fringe CBD office

- Refinances development loan
- Interest reserve account to mitigate sub 1 times ICR
- Exit via sale within 3 years

Terms

Opening Margin:	5.75%
Upfront Fee:	1.05%
Term:	3 years (Bullet)
Rating:	B+ (Internal)
Ranking:	Senior Secured
Covenants:	• Loan to Value Ratio <77.5% • Permitted Distributions: None • Interest Reserve: Fully Funded • Personal Guarantees • Occupancy >75% within 12 months



Residual Stock Finance

Super senior loan secured over stock of unsold but completed apartments

- Refinances development loan when existing financier lacks capital
- Conservative loan based on observable sales data

Opening Margin:	5.00%
Upfront Fee:	0.95%
Term:	2 years (Amortising)
Rating:	BBB (Internal)
Ranking:	Super senior secured
Covenants:	• Where LVR>50%, 100% of sale proceeds to lenders, otherwise 60% • Max LVR 65% tested every 180 days • Interest reserve: 6 months

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Action Items

- Assess existing exposure to CRE debt
- Determine how to identify stress in existing exposures or the wider market
- Develop a plan to take advantage if stress emerges

Key Takeouts

- 1 CRE debt is at the centre of the private credit boom in Australia
- 2 CRE debt has been hit by inflation and higher interest rates with many issues unresolved
- 3 Regulators have turned their focus to CRE debt which increases the risk to investors
- 4 Opportunities could emerge for investors with patient capital

Further reading

1. What We're Watching December, 2024: our quarterly round up across markets (including CRE): <https://www.challengerim.com.au/what-were-watching-quarterly-report-december-2024/>
2. Podcast with Gerard Hargraves, Head of Real Estate Lending: <https://www.investordaily.com.au/podcast/55042-exploring-private-credit-trends-with-gerard-hargraves-from-challenger-investment-management>
3. What We're Watching April 2023: a look at the maths of commercial real estate lending: <https://www.challengerim.com.au/what-were-watching-the-maths-of-commercial-real-estate-lending-april-2023/>
4. What We're Watching September, 2024: a look back at how governance risk can impact performance outcomes in private credit: <https://www.challengerim.com.au/what-were-watching-lessons-from-the-noughties-fooling-some-of-the-people-all-of-the-time/>

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